Dark-Alex-17
300c7aeff0
verification_commands — the shell commands the adversary's run_checks stage
executes — were extracted by the LLM parse node from {{initial_prompt}}, a
flat prompt that also carries untrusted plan/diff text pasted from the repo
under review. A planted '## VERIFICATION' block was indistinguishable from the
caller's declaration: prompt injection -> arbitrary command execution.
- adversary + review-gauntlet graphs declare verification_commands as a graph
variable (default '[]'); the key leaves initial_state (or_insert seeding
would otherwise shadow it) and leaves both parse nodes' instructions,
output_schema.properties and required.
- review-gauntlet forwards it to run_adversary via a structured inputs:
passthrough (lone {{verification_commands}} template), not lane-prompt prose.
- run_checks.py accepts a JSON list or a JSON-encoded string of one (variables
arrive as strings); '[]'/[]/missing = none declared; any other shape fails
closed with a PIPELINE-FAULT (nothing executed) that verdict.py turns into
DIVERGES complaint #1.
- architect/sisyphus spawn templates and both READMEs document the
--variables / --agent-variable form and the trust boundary. Known residual
(llm-node auto-merge of undeclared output keys) is disclosed in the docs.
- Tests: list/JSON-string acceptance, fail-closed no-execution proof,
prompt-prose injection proof, verdict wiring, asset pins for both graphs and
orchestrator configs, dispatch-inputs > variable-override > default
precedence.
150 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
150 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
# Review Gauntlet
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A graph-based post-implementation review gate — **"the done gate"**. An
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orchestrator that must not claim *done* without green reviews spawns this agent
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once instead of judging trigger rules and parsing verdict sentinels itself. The
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graph structure makes skipping a lane or misreading a verdict impossible:
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trigger signals are computed by a script, lanes run as isolated parallel
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sub-agents, and the final verdict is a deterministic regex gate — an LLM never
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gets the chance to rationalize past it.
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```mermaid
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flowchart TD
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parse["parse<br/>(llm: extract request facts)"] --> signals["signals<br/>(script: deterministic diff facts)"]
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parse -. "fallback" .-> pfault["parse_fault<br/>(script: PIPELINE-FAULT marker)"]
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pfault --> gate
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signals --> select["select_lanes<br/>(llm: ADDITIVE-only judgment)"]
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select --> build["build_items<br/>(script: rules floor ∪ additions;<br/>forced lanes override exactly)"]
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select -. "fallback" .-> dlanes["default_lanes<br/>(script: deterministic degraded<br/>selection — wider, never narrower)"]
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dlanes --> build
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build --> mcr["map: code-review"] & madv["map: adversary"] & msec["map: security"] & mpb["map: probe"]
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mcr -->|"over: 0-or-1 items"| rcr[["code-reviewer<br/>(max_attempts: 2)"]]
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madv --> radv[["adversary<br/>(max_attempts: 2)"]]
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msec --> rsec[["security-reviewer<br/>(max_attempts: 2)"]]
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mpb --> rpb[["probe<br/>(max_attempts: 2)"]]
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rcr -. "fallback" .-> lfault["lane_fault<br/>(script: PIPELINE-FAULT lane result,<br/>collected by the map)"]
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radv -. "fallback" .-> lfault
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rsec -. "fallback" .-> lfault
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rpb -. "fallback" .-> lfault
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mcr & madv & msec & mpb --> gate["verdict_gate<br/>(script: sentinel regex — deterministic)"]
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gate --> done(["GAUNTLET: PASS | BLOCKED"])
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```
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## Why a graph
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The four independent review lanes existed before this agent — as **prompt
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discipline** inside the calling orchestrator: "spawn code-reviewer when the
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change is broad", "🔴 always blocks", "INCONCLUSIVE is never PASS". Prompt
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discipline degrades under context pressure: a lane gets skipped, a verdict
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line gets paraphrased, a missing report reads as "nothing to report". Here
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those rules are *structure*:
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- **Lane selection floor is deterministic** (`build_items.py`): code-review
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always runs; adversary runs when a spec/plan is present; security runs on
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attack-surface signals (auth/deps/exec paths or diff content) or hardened
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posture; probe runs when consumer-facing surface changed *and* a local-run
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recipe exists. The `select_lanes` LLM can only **widen** the set — a false
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flag never removes a rule-selected lane. `forced_lanes` from the caller
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override everything exactly.
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- **Conditional lanes without dynamic routing**: each lane is a `map` node
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over a 0-or-1-item list — an empty list means the map runs zero branches
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(map-over-nothing), which *is* the skip mechanism. All four maps join at
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the verdict gate on equal-length paths.
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- **The verdict is a regex, not an opinion** (`verdict_gate.py`): a missing
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sentinel is a lane FAILURE, never a pass; any 🔴 in the code-review report
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blocks regardless of its verdict line; `NEEDS-HUMAN` without 🔴 passes but
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is surfaced under *Human attention required*; probe `INCONCLUSIVE` blocks
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with an environment note — it is never treated as PASS or FAIL.
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- **Verdict independence is structural**: lanes run as isolated sub-agents
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with no `teammates:` flag — no cross-lane messaging, by construction.
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- **Failure fails closed, structurally** (`fallback:` routes + `PIPELINE-FAULT`
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markers): every LLM node and lane retries once (`max_attempts: 2`), then a
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fallback fires instead of killing the graph — and every fallback degrades
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toward BLOCKED, never toward a pass. A dead lane becomes a `PIPELINE-FAULT:`
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lane result (`lane_fault.py`) that the gate reports as BLOCKED *naming the
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lane* — distinct from SKIPPED (not selected). A dead `parse` records a fault
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and jumps straight to the gate (`parse_fault.py`). A dead `select_lanes`
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degrades to a deterministic selection (`default_lanes.py`): code-review +
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adversary, plus probe on consumer surface, plus security on auth/deps/exec
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signals or hardened posture, unioned with caller-forced lanes — wider, never
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narrower. A crashed `build_items` records a fault so an all-SKIPPED gate
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still blocks. Fault detection is prefix-anchored — a real review that merely
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*quotes* "PIPELINE-FAULT:" flows to the normal sentinel rules. And the
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`GAUNTLET:` sentinel is always emitted: even a crashed gate prints
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`GAUNTLET: BLOCKED`, never silence.
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## Sentinels parsed
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| Lane | Sentinel | Blocks on |
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|------|----------|-----------|
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| code-reviewer | `**Verdict: MERGE-READY \| NEEDS-HUMAN**` | any 🔴 finding; missing sentinel |
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| adversary | `ADVERSARIAL_REVIEW: CONFORMS \| DIVERGES` | DIVERGES; missing sentinel |
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| security-reviewer | `SECURITY_REVIEW: PASS \| FAIL` | FAIL; missing sentinel |
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| probe | `USAGE_PROBE: PASS \| FAIL \| INCONCLUSIVE` | FAIL; INCONCLUSIVE (environment note); missing sentinel |
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## Spawning it
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```
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agent__spawn --agent review-gauntlet --prompt "Post-implementation review gate.
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Project: /abs/path/to/repo
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Diff: main...HEAD (a git range, a ref, or 'worktree' for uncommitted changes)
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Rigor: production Security posture: standard
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Plan / acceptance criteria:
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<paste the criteria the implementation must satisfy — enables the adversary lane>
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Local-run recipe / usage suites:
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<how to boot the service locally + where existing suites live — enables the probe lane>
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Forced lanes: (optional — e.g. 'adversary, probe' to run exactly those)" \
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--variables {"verification_commands": "[\"cargo test --all\", \"cargo clippy -- -D warnings\"]"}
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```
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Verification commands are NOT part of the prompt. They are the declared
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`verification_commands` graph variable (default `'[]'`; a JSON array of shell
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commands as a string, since agent variables arrive as strings), also settable
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from the CLI:
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```sh
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coyote -a review-gauntlet --agent-variable project_dir /abs/path/to/repo \
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--agent-variable verification_commands '["cargo test --all"]' "<prompt>"
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```
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The reply ends with `GAUNTLET: PASS` or `GAUNTLET: BLOCKED`, a lane status
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table, the lane-selection reasons, blockers, attention items, and each lane's
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full report in a collapsible section. On BLOCKED: fix the findings per your
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own findings-handling rules, then spawn a **fresh** gauntlet run. On PASS with
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*Human attention required*: complete the work but carry those items into your
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final report verbatim.
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## Notes
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- The caller decides *whether* review is warranted at all (the gauntlet is for
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non-trivial work — that's why code-review is unconditionally on); the
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gauntlet decides *which* of the other lanes apply and what the verdicts mean.
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- Lane sub-agents get generous finite timeouts (2h each; 3h whole-gauntlet)
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and one retry (`max_attempts: 2`). A lane that still dies or times out falls
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back to the `lane_fault` marker — BLOCKED naming the lane, never a silent
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pass.
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- The `verification_commands` variable is forwarded to the adversary lane as a
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structured `inputs:` passthrough on `run_adversary` (a lone `{{…}}` template
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lands the raw value in the child's state) — never through the lane prompt
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and never extracted by `parse`. The adversary's `run_checks` stage executes
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those commands with a shell, which makes the declaration a trust boundary:
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the prompt also carries plan text pasted from the repo under review, so
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commands must never be inferred from it (residual: the engine still merges
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every top-level key of `parse`'s output into state, so an extra
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`verification_commands` key emitted by the LLM is not yet blocked).
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Undeclared stays undeclared
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(`'[]'` ⇒ "none declared"); a declaration that is not a JSON array of
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strings executes nothing and records a `PIPELINE-FAULT`, which the
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adversary lane reports as DIVERGES and the gate as BLOCKED.
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- Signals failures degrade gracefully: if git can't compute the diff, lane
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selection falls back to caller context + forced lanes, and the report notes
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it. The auth-path regex deliberately over-fires (`auth(?!or)` matches
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auth/authn/authz/oauth but not "author") — the safe direction, since signals
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only ever ADD the security lane.
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- Requires the `code-reviewer`, `adversary`, `security-reviewer`, and `probe`
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agents to be installed (they ship with Coyote).
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